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Ecstasy and Nonduality:
On Comparing Varieties of Immanence
John J. Thatamanil
V anderbilt University Divinity School
Immanence and Scripture
FOR the benefit of those who have not read my
book, let me offer a few framing remarks. I
begin by noting that my initial working title for
the book was Ecstasy and Nonduality, not The
Immanent Divine. Although somewhat technical,
the earlier title had the virtue of stipulating that
my book compares two specific types of divine
immanence. I root each sort of immanence in a
fundamental scriptural locus within the Christian
and Hindu traditions. In the Christian case, the
scriptural text is Romans 8:26, "Likewise the
Spirit helps us in our weakness; for we do not
know how to pray as we ought, but that very
Spirit intercedes with sighs too deep for words"
(NRSV). The King James Version reads,
"Likewise the Spirit also helpeth our infirmities:
for we know not what we should pray for as we
ought: but the Spirit itself maketh intercession
for us with groanings which cannot be uttered."
In the Hindu case, the scriptural text is the
Upanishadic mahavakya, "Aham Brahmasmi"
from Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 1.4.10. In this
Christian scripture, divine immanence is
experienced as an ecstatic event accomplished
by the work of the Holy Spirit that grasps and
prays through us when we know not how to

pray. In the Hindu scripture, immanence is given
by way of nonduality: one just is Brahman.
Rather than examining and comparing these
verses directly, I turned to two theologians
whose entire corpus can be read as extended
commentary on these verses. In the Christian
case, I chose Paul Tillich and in the Hindu case,
Sankara. So, contrary to McLaughlin's
contention that the book begins with and adheres
to some vaguely Spinozistic or Deleuzian notion
of immanence rather than begin by way of
scripture, this book is about just these two
modes of healing immanence as understood by
way of theological reflection on key scriptural
loci. My book also concludes by suggesting that
Tillich's fondness for Romans 8:26 can be
enriched by a fuller attention to Galatians 2:20
:where Paul writes, "And it is no longer I who
live, but it is Christ who lives in me." This more
stable and enduring kind of immanence
bespeaks a strong doctrine of sanctification, one
that remains insufficiently developed in Tillich's
own theology - but might be possible for
Tillichians after a more thorough encounter with
Sankara's nondualism.
The compelling and challenging question
that might be put to my book is whether I have
selected the right H~du conversation partner.
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After all, there is no shortage of ecstatic
immanence in Hindu traditions. I am thinking in
particular of the Tamil poet-saint Nammalvar
and by extension of the Sri Vaisnava tradition
for whom he is central. Nammalvar believes that
his own poetry is itself the Lord's singing
through him. 1 Here we fmd what appears to be a
profound homology to the Pauline notion of the
Spirit that prays in us. The challenge to be posed
to a work like mine is not that it has embraced
some generic extrascriptural notion of
immanence but that it has not engaged the right
sort of immanence. To such a hypothetical
challenge, I respond as follows: we need a wide
variety of comparative projects in order to
understand better the relationship between
Hindu and Christian traditions and thinkers. I
welcome such additional projects and would
argue that there is no such thing as a "natural"
comparison. I venture a comparison of Tillich
and Sankara precisely because Sankara's
nondualism is a more difficult and demanding
challenge to Christian habits of mind whereas
Sri Vaisnava traditions and the theology of
Ramanuja are likely to seem more familiar.
Moreover, both Tillich and Sankara, although
they appeal to different types of immanence,
share a deep commitment to the notion that
ultimate reality is not a being among beings and
is moreover transpersonal. 2 That said, a three
way exchange between Tillich, Sankara and
Ramanuja is very much needed if we are to
clarify ongoing conversations on the relationship
between God and the world especially those that
go by the name of panentheism.
The Question of Orientalism

Writing comparative theology is a complex
matter fraught with a great many dangers. The
sins of 19th century predecessors who went by
the name "comparative theologian" inevitably
weigh upon the mind. In my case, writing as I
am about Sankara and Tillich,a preoccupation
with Rudolf Otto was inevitable. I am thinking
in particular of his important work Mysticism
East and West which offered a full-scale
comparison of Eckhart and Sankara. 3 Tillich's
indebtedness to Eckhart makes this comparison
an especially sensitive matter. Those who have
taken the time to read Otto's book carefully will
https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/vol22/iss1/8
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know that it is a sophisticated and careful work,
one that gets Sankara right in multiple ways,
most especially in Otto's appreciation of the
often overlooked theistic dimensions of
Sankara's thought. Nonetheless, his work has
rightly come in for criticism for drawing a sharp
and asymmetrical dichotomy between East and
West, between a passive and ethically deficient
Eastern mysticism and a dynamic and worldaffirming Western mysticism., On every relevant
point of comparison, Eckhart's mysticism is
shown to be superior to Sankara's mysticism. In
a post-Saidian, postcolonial world to replay such
dichotomous dualisms would amount to an
unpardonable sin. I wrote my book with a
hypersensitivity to that issue and strove
assiduously to avoid that sin. Whether I erred by
remaining so focused on avoiding that particular
error and thereby fell prey to a whole host of
others is a question that I must largely (though
not wholly) leave for my readers.
It, therefore, gave me no small pause to see
that Michelle Voss Robert's response begins
with just these considerations. Thankfully and to
my immense relief, Roberts judges that I have
not fallen prey to the sin of the old orientalism.
Her worry is rather different, and in truth,
equally as frightening-all the more so because
it is a sin that I had not considered. She poses
the question shrewdly and with remarkable skill.
Writing about Rambachan's and my worldaffirming Advaita, she writes "Are these
dynamic, active, worldly non-dualisms new
vindications of an essentially 'Christian' way of
thinking? Do Christianity and the West still win
out in the end? Is it all just a 'logic of the same'
in which Advaita Vedanta now mirrors the West
positively instead of serving as its photographic
negative-in other words, does Advaita now
gain credibility because it so closely resembles
what the West values?" I consider this a
genuinely probing and important question.
Thankfully, Roberts has exonerated both
Rambachan and me from this charge, and for
that I am both grateful and relieved. For my
part, I would point only to the way in which
Rambachan and I generate our more worldaffIrming reading of Sallkara. First, both of us
explicitly recognize that Sankara had little
patience for subjective idealism of the sort that
he found in Buddhist Yogacara. Sankara
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explicitly rejected the idea that the world was
merely a projection of mind just as he rejected
the idea that there is no fundamental difference
between the waking state and the dream state.
Secondly, Rambachan makes an additional
appeal to key Upanishadic texts to justify a more
world-affIrming reading of Advaita. These are
but two of many examples that demonstrate that
a world-affIrming reading of Advaita is not
derived by appeal to extrinsic Christian sources
or norms. As Roberts rightly notes, the very
charge that a world-affirming Advaita can only
be generated by readers motivated by Christian
concerns is to suggest that only Christians and
the West are capable of world-affIrmative
reflection. Orientalism indeed! That said,
Roberts is right to urge us to proceed further by
developing the resources of a world-affirming
Advaita for a variety of ends including
ecological ethics.
Learning from Sankara: On Apophatic
Anthropology and the Status of Avidya

At this juncture, I would like to note that my
own overriding theological concern is whether
Christian theology might more closely mirror
Advaita rather than the other way around. The
charge that would genuinely count against my
project is one that contends that despite offering
another more or less careful reading of Advaita,
I have l~arned nothing from it, that my Christian
theology continues on its course very much as it
would have prior to encounter with Sankara.
That charge strikes me as more serious because I
believe that we are most likely to avoid old
orientalisms just to the extent that we learn with
and from persons of other traditions and are
transformed by that learning.
For the sake of brevity, let me enumerate
just two of the principle lessons that I have
learned from Sankara. First, affirming
nonduality does not amount to eviscerating
transcendence. Put simply, the Advaita
affIrmation that the true self (atman) just is
Brahman, the ultimate world ground, is not to
know what Brahman is. As Rambachan and I
both show, Sankara is absolutely relentless in
affirming that even the most cherished terms in
the
Advaita
vocabulary-self
(atman),
conscious1).ess (cit), and being (sat)-are not
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ultimate and must fmally be surpassed. The
resulting position might well be called an
'.'apophatic anthropology," one in which the true
self remains necessarily a mystery to itself. The
old Delphic and Socratic imperative, "Know
Thyself' is accomplished, most paradoxically,
when we realize that we cannot in fact know
what we most truly are. Sankara's Advaita
generates the most radical coincidence between
immanence and what I am calling a noetic
transcendence rather than a spatialized
transcendence. Contrary to the possible
apprehension that nonduality eviscerates
transcendence, I show that Advaita excludes
only a spatialized traJ;lscendence. True, a visual
metaphor that imagines Brahman as being
elsewhere and above the world simply makes no
sense from within Sankara's frame as my very
being just is Brahman. But having said that,
Sankara compels me to add that Brahman
remains that from which all words and
cognitions must fall away. Brahman is an
excessive mystery to which language and
thought is necessarily inadequate.
The second major lesson I draw from
Sankara is that one can generate a profound and
sobering account of the human predicament
without rooting it in a fundamental ontological
fault or rupture. Sankara presents a devastating
picture of human life as marked by craving
(raga) and aversion (dvesa), by grief (soka) and
delusion (moha), which are in turn rooted in
fundamental ignorance (avidya). Nonetheless,
Sankara also consistently refuses to theorize
avidya. If samsara as marked by craving,
aversion, grief, and delusion is Sankara's
diagnosis of the human predicament and if
avidya is Sankara's etiological explanation for
how we come to be in this predicament, Sankara
refuses to make the further move of asking about
the very condition for the possibility of
ignorance. He does not ask, "Why avidya?,"
because to take the question seriously would
result in dualism. If avidya is taken to be realand those who believe that avidya must be
explained necessarily assume that it is
ontologically real-then there would be a
second reality' over against Brahman and
Advaita would be negated. As Daniel Ingalls has
shown, for Sankara ignorance is a practical,
pedagogical, and even soteriological problem
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that needs to be addressed and treated but not
theorized. 4
The Problem of Evil

And this question about the status of
ignorance brings me to McLaughlin's challenge
that my position, derived from Sankara, risks
trivializing evil and underplays the reality of the
tragic. McLaughlin suggests that in my
commitment to keep with Sankara's strong
account of divine immanence, I willfully ignore
the brutalities of human history and wish away
the tragic complexities of human experience,
even or perhaps especially that of would be
saints. But, as I have already shown, I explicitly
commend both Sankara and Tillich for their
strong and compelling diagnoses of the human
predicament. Indeed, I explicitly critique
Vivekananda's polemic against Christianity
famously epitomized in his fiery proclamation,
"It is a sin to call men sinners."s Vivekananda
hopes to counter abusive treatments of Hindu
traditions by contending that Hinduism, unlike
Christian faith, affirms the dignity of the human
soul by refusing to call human beings sinners.
But Vivekananda's assertion fails to register·
much in Sankara's Advaita. While the term sin
is absent, I spend many pages demonstrating that
Sankara offers a devastating account of the
human predicament and afflictions (klesa) that
compromise human life. I do so explicitly to
undo Vivekananda's occidentalism which is
itself an aggressive inversion of orientalism. I
dwell on this point because I am convinced that
sensitive and nuanced comparative theology
cannot get underway if comparativists do not
break out of such polemical loops.
What I leave behind in Tillich is not his
bleak diagnosis of the human predicament but
rather his limited prognosis and even more so
the ontology that renders such a prognosis
inevitable. Sankara's Advaita by contrast
demonstrates that there need be no necessary
connection between a grave diagnosis of the
human predicament and a limited prognosis of
the same. Just as a patient might simultaneously
hear both that he has cancer and that the cancer
is entirely curable, it is possible to generate an
acute account of the human predicament and yet
to affirm a robust hope for comprehensive

https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/vol22/iss1/8
DOI: 10.7825/2164-6279.1435

healing. 6 What I reject in Tillich is his near
claim that human fallenness is ontologicaUy
necessary and his explicit claim that fallenness
is ontologicaUy unavoidable. For Tillich,
creatures can only be free if they stand outside
the divine life, but just because they stand
outside the divine life, their fallenness is
unavoidable. Freedom comes with a very steep
price as it perpetually threatens anything like a
progressive movement into sanctification. In
contrast to Tillich, I explicitly join Sankara in
affirming that human beings can be both free
and "fallen" without positing a fundamental
dualism or distance between self and divinity.
One can be Brahman and yet also be caught up
in suffering of the human predicament. No
attempt is made to explain just how this is
possible. The task at hand is not to offer an
explanation but rather to bring about liberation. 7
My own primary motives are soteriological:
I refuse to posit a fundamental rupture between
God and humanity in order to allow for richer
prospects for spiritual perfection, understood as
sanctification in Christian traditions and living
liberation (jivanmukti) in Sankara. Against
Tillich's Lutheranism which offers relatively
limited expectations for sanctification and is
entirely lacking in any account of spiritual
discipline-the latter always come under
suspicion of works righteousness-I stand with
both Wesley and Sankara in their sense that
human beings are capable of experiencing deep
and healing transformation. It is .true that
Sankara is absolutely relentless in affirming that
liberation cannot be generated by action; Tillich
would concur. But unlike Tillich, Sankara offers
an account of karma yoga as a preparatory
spiritual discipline that can make room for
liberating knowledge. Moreover, once such
liberating knowledge takes hold, the liberated
person (jivanmukta) can live a life that is beyond
bondage to afflictions and faults and in so doing
live out a life of spontaneous compassion. Such
a person is no longer obligated to follow ethical
norms of dharma. In that sense, the jivanmukta
is to use the Pauline phrase beyond the law.
This trajectory of thought should suffice to
counter or at least' to soften McLaughlin's
charge that I offer no account of spiritual
transformation. Perhaps I do not go far enough,
but I surely argue that resources for such an
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account of spiritual discipline can be found in
Sankara's thought especially in his Gitabhasya.
Since McLaughlin has explicitly raised the
question of whether the vision I articulate can
offer robust possibilities for self-sacrifice and
even martyrdom, let me add here that· I believe
that we have grounds for believing that human
beings are capable of radical spiritual disciplines
such as those of nonviolent resistance-ahimsa
expressed as satyagraha-just to the extent that
human beings possess, or are endowed by
participation in the divine life, with the capacity
for radical non-egocentric compassion even
when confronted by the most vicious and brutal
forms of human evil.
McLaughlin believes that I can generate my
optimistic account of human spiritual capacities
only by downplaying any serious account of the
human predicament. He fmds this inadequacy
expressed in my vague categories of
estrangement and self-enclosed fmitude which
sound far less dire and depressing than
traditional Christian talk about sin and guilt. I
believe that McLaughlin has overlooked. perhaps I underemphasized the point-that I
appeal to a more abstract terminology, in part,
because I believe that configurations of sin and
alienation are deeply local Tillich himself noted
that Christian understandings of the human
predicament have shifted markedly over the
course of western history. For the early Church,
the human predicament was experienced as
bondage to the powers of sin, death, and the
devil. In the medieval period, the human
predicament was experienced in terms of guilt
and debt, a debt that must be paid to the Divine.
Against
these
culturally
contingent
configurations of sin, Tillich argued that sin or
estrangement in his own time had to be
reconfigured in terms of meaninglessness.
The more abstracted or "vague" account of
sin as estrangement or self-enclosed finitude is,
at least in part, my attempt to recognize that the
human predicament can take on a variety of
local configurations in different historical and
cultural milieus. My goal is not to downplay
these particular configurations of estrangement
but rather to be cautious about imposing some
particular theological anthropology or some
particular account of the human predicament as
universal, and then writing such accounts into
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one's ontology. I am thinking here of forms of
missionary malpractice that have insisted that
only Christian tradition has the cure for the
disease of sin and guilt while ignoring that other
traditions do not diagnose or experience the
human predicament in these terms. Such
missionizing ends up selling not just the
Christian cure but also as it happens the
Christian disease, a disease that the missionized
did not even know they had!
In sum, from Tillich I have learned to be
attentive to the variety of ways in which the
human predicament is configured and from
Sankara, I have learned not to ontologize any
such account as implying a tragic rupture
between human beingsc and divinity. My sense is
that McLaughlin has overestimated my
indebtedness to Neville who takes up no more
than 20 pages of my book and has
\underestimated my indebtedness to both Tillich
and most especially to Sankara.
More fundamentally, McLaughlin's most
profound worries about my project surface at
just those moments when I try to reconfigure
Christian theology by appeal to Sankara. At just
these moments, we hear predictable worries
,about syncretism, about the melding of religious
traditions. The constraints of space will not
permit me to offer an extended response to these
and
other noteworthy
objections
that
McLaughlin advances concerning agency, heroic
self-sacrifice, and the nature of spiritual
disciplines.
I conclude by asserting that if comparative
theology fails to learn from and be transformed
by interreligious encounter, it will surely fall
prey to the errors of the Christian colonial past,
the errors that Roberts so well enumerates. The
other will remain not only other, but an other to
be refuted, chastened, or converted possessing at
most "a ray of that truth" found in the fullness of
Christian tradition. McLaughlin's appeal to
N astra Aetate suggests that he remains unwilling
to move beyond the version of inclusivism
articulated in that Vatican II document. This
refusal leaves us with the impression that
Christians have nothing at all to learn from what
others have come to know about God by way of
their own deep traditions. But if in fact
Christians have little to learn, and if moreover,
any such learning amounts to a syncretism that
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brings with it the threat of identity loss, then
why venture into comparative theology at all?
An older style of apologetics would suffice.
Notes
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1 "My lord/who swept me away forever/into joy that
day,/made me over into himself/and sang in
Tamillhis own sweet songs/through me .... "
Nammalvar, Hymns for the Drowning: Poems for
Visnu by Nammalvar, trans. A.K. Ramanujan (New
York: Penguin Books, 1993) 85.
2 By now, the notion that Tillich or Sankara holds to
an impersonal or nonpersonal conception of divinity
has largely been discredited in the relevant scholarly
communities. However, the notion that ultimate
reality cannot be characterized as either a person or
as a being among beings does mean that in some
sense ultimate reality exceeds the personal. Hence,
my term "transpersonal."
3 Rudolf Otto, Mysticism East and West: A
Comparative Analysis of the Nature of Mysticism,
trans. Bertha L. Bracey (1932; reprint, Wheaton, Ill:
The Theosophical Publishing House, 1987).
4 Daniel H. H. Ingalls, "Sankara on the Question:
Whose is Avidya?" Philosophy East and West 3:1
(1953) 69-72.
5 Vivekananda, "Chicago Addresses," The Yogas and
Other Works, ed. Swami Nikhi1ananda (New York:
Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center, 1953), 188.
.
6 Indeed, one might well wonder if any tradition can
endure if it either trivializes the gravity of the human
predicament as experienced and suffered or fails to
offer a deep and lasting hope for treating that
predicament. Might it be a cross-cultural criterion for
assessing the adequacy of a religious vision that it
must accomplish both tasks well?
7, Although space constraints prevent the possibility
of venturing a full scale argument, I believe that
Sankara's refusal to provide an ontology of avidya
has intriguing resonances with a long N eoplatonic
and Christian theological trajectory that treats evil as
privation and insists that it has no positive reality or
being. As noted earlier, it is precisely' because
Sankara does not want to give avidya any ontological
status that he refuses to give a theoretical account of
avidya and its origins.
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